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Abstract 
This paper examines lending by a Genoese-led cartel to Philip II of Spain (1556-1598) from the 
perspective of theory on sovereign debt. I find that a class of debt models which assumes lenders 
have an additional penalty beyond denying future credit accounts for the principal features of 
the episode. In particular, a version of Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) with asymmetric information 
accounts for the Genoese's imposition of an embargo on payment transfers to Philip Il's Army 
of Flanders. In addition, this model's predictions for debt ceilings corresponds to evidence on 
the Crown's debt ceiling and estimates of lower bounds on the value of the Genoese's penalty 
and the Crown's ability to repay. Evidence from the episode goes against debt models that 
posit that implicit insurance is essential to the self-enforcement of sovereign debt: when Philip 
11 lost the Armada in 1588, easily the biggest "bad shock" of the reign, there was no default, 
bankruptcy, or effort to reschedule debt held by the Genoese cartel. 
I. Introduction 
The history of sovereign lending over the last five hundred years is marked by numerous episodes 
of partial default or repudiation. Medieval princes, absolute monarchs, dictators and democratic 
regimes alike have been reliable and poor credit risks at one time or another. In more recent 
times, the rapid expansion of lending to LDCs in the 1970s led to a series of reschedulings and 
partial defaults in the 1980s. Another expansion of international capital flows to a more select 
group of LDCs in the late 1980s and early 1990s has created concern that similar consequences 
may arise again. The sustainability of the debt of nations such as Belgium, Canada, Italy or 
the U .5. is not beyond question. rusk of sovereign default is an enduring phenomenon, appears 
likely to remain, and poses a major obstacle to the movement of capital across national borders 
and the conduct of fiscal policy. 
A number of theories in the literature on sovereign debt make various predictions about the 
level of sustainable debt.1 Bulow and Rogoff (1989a) show that a sovereign will not repay and 
that lenders will not lend if the only threat lenders possess is to indefirute1y cut off future loans. 
That is, "reputation" arising through repeated interaction does not necessarily provide the 
sovereign sufficient incentive to repay.l Addressing the challenge posed by this result, two broad 
classes of models elaborate environments where reputation does sustain positive debt. The first 
class of models posits that sovereigns borrow to smooth expenditures and that partial defaults 
and debt reschedulings represent implicit state-contingency in sovereign lending agreements. If 
lenders can cut off all other alternatives for insurance, including self-insurance through savings, 
as well as future lenwng, then debt is sustainable. In these models the state-contingency of 
lending is essential to the enforcement mechanism of the contract.3 The second class of models 
that supports sovereign lending assumes that sovereigns do have access to alternative vehicles 
IThe seminal article on international sovereign lending in the contemporary a.nalytical idiom is by Eaton and 
Gersovitz (1981). 
2This result strikes muy as surprising. It works u follows: production for the sovereign's economy is specified 
as 1(1,-1, �,), where [,_1 is investment ud z, is an exogenous shock. It must always be at least as good for 
the sovereign to use the amount it is scheduled to repay, .(�,), u it is to keep the sum for iu own use. I£ one 
assumes that 
1. the sovereign can use some portion o{ '(�I) to buy an insurance agreement that sp&D.s all contingencies, 
g(�I+d, from financiers other than its lenders 
2. lenders can impose no penalty other th�n refusing to lend in the futare, 
3. the contingent savings muket is competitive, E,g(zl+d_ = (1 + r).(�,), ud 
4. contingent savings deposits do not give negative payouts, g(zf+d � 0, 
then the debt ceiling that ma.kes the 50vereign indifferent between repudia.tion and repayment is zero. The 
intuition of the result is that in the presence of perfect insurance market., inlurlLllce is as good a way to buy 
insurance u stAte-contingent debt. 
lGrossman and Van Huyck (1988), Atkeson (1991). 
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for savings and insurance, however lenders, in addition to cutting off future lending, can impose 
broader and more costly penalties than those narrowly pertaining to the loan contract itself.1 
In this class of models, any state-contingency lending contracts might exhibit is incidental to 
their enforceability; the threat of an additional penalty is what sustains lending. 
The reign of Philip II of Spain ( 1556-1598) provides an unusually good test episode for these 
two classes of theories. The episode allows us to 
1. observe the debt ceiling Philip I1's lenders imposed 
2. bound below the cost of penalties to the sovereign 
3. bound below the sovereign'S ability to repay. 
My main result is that the episode provides broad support for the additional penalty class of 
models. Specifically, two events during the episode, i.) an embargo of specie shipments imposed 
by Genoese lenders on Philip II's Army of Flanders during a royal bankruptcy in 1575 - 1578, 
and ii.) the lack of a default, bankruptcy, or effort to reschedule debt by Philip II after losing 
the Armada in 1588, give broad support for an asymmetric information version of the model 
of Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) and provide clear evidence against the implicit-insurance class of 
debt models. 
Historical Significance 
The relationship between military power and economic growth is a central question in his­
tory, political economy, and international relations.s A dilemma all sovereigns face, commonly 
referred to as the fiscal commitment problem, is a core determinant of this relationship: the 
need 'to protect citizens and enforce contracts compels the state to finance a military, yet the 
fiscal pressure of military competition tempts the state to abrogate the very contracts it is 
charged with enforcing in order to raise revenue.6 
The reign of Philip II (1556-1598) bears significantly on the proposition that fiscal com­
mitment determines the relationship between military power and economic growth. The reign 
4Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) show that if lenders impose a trade embargo on a sovereign ",ho attempts re­
pudia.tion positive debt can be supported. Fernandez and Rosentha.l (1990) use a fra.mewollr. whele lavorable 
commercial treaties, financia.l advantages and other benefits are extended to good borrowers. Cole and Kehoe 
(1994) show that if other international strategic relationships, such u cooperation over rights to a. common, 
non-excluda.ble resource, are linked to debt the sovereign will repay. 
sBrewer (1988), Fox (1991), Kennedy (1987), North (1981), Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986). Tracey (1985). 
Schultz and Weingut (1995. 
'Greif, Milgrom and Weingut (1994) focus on the commitment problem during the Midd.1e Ages. Sargent 
and Velde (1995), address how the F,ench state dealt with the milita.ry-fiscal dilemma from 1780 to 1800. Bordo 
and White (1991) consider the same theme in a. comparison ol English and French monetary policy during the 
N apoieonic Wars. 
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marked the last credible attempt by a European dynasty to gain domination over the continent 
until Napoleon. The events of the half-century revealed that the landscape of dynastic-military 
competition would be one of "political plurality in Europe, containing five or six major states, 
and various smaller ones" for the next two centuries.? The historical contribution of this analy­
sis is that it unveils the mechanics of the commitment arrangements that sustained the Spanish 
Crown's debt. The paper reveals how the constraints posed by these arrangements affected 
the Crown's military outcomes. The results provide a valuable comparison to later European 
military contests wh.ich were shaped by the dynamics of the fiscal commitment problem to an 
equally large degree.8 
The Events 
From 1 556 to 1598, Philip II waged war against the Ottoman Empire, Dutch rebels, Por­
tugal, France, England, and principalities in Italy and Germany. His navy engaged foes and 
privateers throughout the Mediterranean, Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. As a whole, 
these military enterprises were successful: the Ottoman empire ceased to be either a land or 
naval threat to Europe after the Battle of Lepanto (1571), Spain's colonial possessions were 
solidified and generated increasing revenues, and the empire was expanded with the addition 
of Portugal, its colonies, and the Ph.ilipines. The continuing rebellion by Dutch rebels in the 
Low Countries, engaged by Spain's Army of Flanders, and the loss of the Armada in 1588 are 
prominant exceptions to the otherwise preponderant :success of Spanish arms during the period. 
The revenues the Crown depended on to meet volatile and increasing military expenditures 
were also volatile and increasing. This created three financial necessities: to anticipate increas­
ing revenues,9 to cover the difference between fluctuating revenues and expenditures, and to 
transfer specie from Castile to the king's troops fighting outside of Spain. 
The Crown contracted international credit through the asiento, a high interest, short-term 
debt contract, lent by a Genoese-Ied cartel.lO In sixteenth century usage "'asiento" was a general 
term that described a variety of contracts, and the Crown often contracted specie transfers or 
foreign exchange transactions within the same contracts that governed lending. The Crown 
typically owed creditors three to four million ducats in asientos (roughly one half of a typical 
'Kennedy (1987), p. 31. . 
'Nortb ud Weingut (1989), Puker (19805), Sa..rgent &lid Velde (1995), Tracey (19805), White (1989). 
�Milituy contests during the period were as much contests of fina.nce as anything else. The power that could 
spend tbe most for a sustained period genera.lly won, and outspending rivals at critical junctures wu crucial. 
Sovereigns who believed tbat revenues and spoils of wa.r offset its costs were quiclcly disabused of tbe expecta.tion. 10 A.iento. were lent by a number of international lenders, among them Spanish men of commerce, F1emisb 
financiers, Florentine merchants, and wealthy investors in Germany. However the Genoese were by far the most 
prominent lenders in the cutel. Below,l will refer to tbe entire group of lenders as simply "tbe Genoese". 
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year's total revenues), though the figure rose on various occasions above eight million, once to 
fifteen million (over two years' revenues). 
There were three royal "bankruptcies" during the reign in 1557, 1575, and 1596.11 When 
settled relatively cooperatively, as in 1557 through 1560, and in 1596 through 1597, the Crown 
emerged from bankruptcy with its finances and military prospects improved. When settled 
slowly and acrimoniously, as happened in the long negociations of 1575 through 1578, the 
king's armies floundered for lack of fundsP Contrary to common perception, the Spanish 
Crown's bankruptcies were not wholesale repudiations of obligations to creditors nor signs of 
Crown insolvency. Rather, they were events where diverse creditors re-elaborated and swapped 
claims upon the CrowD, apparently with the aim of solidifying their claims' collectability in the 
future.13 On the occasion of the bankruptcy of 1575, the Crown resisted the demands of the 
Genoese-Ied cartel. The stand-off that resulted led the Genoese to impose a three-year embargo 
on all currency transfers and letters of exchange between the Crown and its agents and troops 
in the Low Countries where it was engaged in a major campaign against Dutch rebels. A direct 
consequence of this measure was that in November, 1576, troops of the king's own Army of 
Flanders mutineed and sacked Antwerp because they had not been paid. This was a grave 
military set-back for Philip. Shortly afterward, the king began negociating with the Genoese 
once again. In the end, the bankruptcy of 1575, like those of 1557 and 1596, was concluded 
with the Crown paying off its arrears in asientos with a combination of specie and newly issued 
juroS.14 In early 1578 the Genoese ended their embargo on transfers of payment to the Crown's 
troops and agents abroad. 
Despite the frequency, and on the one occasion acrimony, of the Crown's bankruptcies, 
the Crown repaid its asiento creditors to the extent that each bankruptcy was settled to the 
satisfaction of the Genoese: they resumed financial services immediately afterward and made 
high ex post positive returns on lending to the Crown relative to their other opportunities. IS 
The Argument 
The additional penalty class of debt models accounts for why Phillp II repaid his lenders. 
Jilt has been generally thought that there was a bankruptcy in 1560. Professor Felipe Ruiz Martin has kindly 
pointed out to me thllt his more recent re&dings of uchiva.1 documents indicate thllt the negociations betwt1!:n 
haners and the king in 1560 were ilCtually a continuation of the 1557 bankruptcy and not an independent event. 
llBraudel (1972) v. I p. 506; Brl.udel (1979) p. 168; Lynch (1981), Puer (1985). 
uThompSon (1994&) states, "Conventionally, the series of Crown 'bankruptcies' ... have been taken as an 
indicator of ... fiscal crisis. However [their) periodicity suggests that, rather than manifestations of 'crisis', these 
were an integral part of the financial system of the Monuchy. These events ... were I. rescheduling of debts, but 
they did not mean the Crown was without resources." 
14 Juro, were annuity-like bonds with vuying properties, funded on puticuw tu IiOUrces within Castile and 
held by Castilian subjectl. 
uBraudel (1979) p. 167, Conklin (1994). 
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The Genoese had a. penalty technology to use against the Crown, a boycott on specie delivery 
from Spain to the king's troops in Flanders. I reject the implicit insurance class of debt models: 
the most clearly identifiable a bad shock during Philip's reign was the loss of the Armada in 
1588. This event elicited no concessionary terms from the Genoese, nor did it provoke a royal 
bankruptcy or a rescheduling of payments from the king. Within the additional penalty class 
of debt models, the assumptions of Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) most closely matc� the circum­
stances of Philip 11 and his Genoese lenders. However the assumption of perfect information 
this model makes is implausible for sixteenth century Europe. Relaxing the assumption should 
change the implications of their model in predictable fashion. Their current results predict no 
punishment phases along the "path of play". Models of repeated strategic interaction with im­
perfect information predict punishment phases along the path of play.l6 Events during Philip 
II's reign are consistent with this modification: the Genoese's penalty was imposed on the 
Crown, that is, it occurred along the path of play. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 11 summarizes theory. Section III covers more 
historical background. Section IV considers whether contracts between the Crown and the 
Genoese conformed to predictions of the implicit insurance class of models; it concludes they 
did not. Sections V and VI test the claim that the additional penalty class of models accounts 
for lending by the Genoese to Philip 11. Section V examines whether episode fulfills the main 
requirement of the additional penalty class of models: whether the Genoese had a penalty, 
and if it was comparable to those specified in the literature. Section VI compares Bulow and 
Rogoff's (1989b) model's predictions to estimates of lower bounds on the Crown's ability to 
repay, the value of the Genoese's penalty, and the Crown's debt limit. Section VII concludes. 
11. Theory on Sovereign Debt 
The argument draws on three specific models, the first two from the implicit insurance class of 
models, the third from the additional penalty class of models. 
Grossman and Van Huyck {1988}. The model of Grossman and Van Huyck posits that if 
a sovereign has limited access to insurance, and as well seeks to borrow to increase production 
in the future, the lending contract serves both to provide capital and to insure against adverse 
shocks. If the sovereign has no other means available for saving or insuring itself, reputational 
equilibria with postitive lending arise where lenders offer the sovereign implicit insurance. If 
the sovereign is enduring a bad year, it requests lower payment by initiating a partial default. 
16 Atkeson (1991), Abreu, Peuch and Sta.cchetti (1986, 1990). See discussion of theory, below. 
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Because partial defaults do not represent abrogations of the true implicit agreement, lenders 
do not invoke moratoria on new lending or other sanctions that other literature predicts. The 
model of Grossman and Van Huyck also predicts that true abrogations of the implicit debt 
agreement (Urepudiations") are most likely to occur when a sovereign receives a favorable shock 
because its scheduled repayment is high and its lenders will not forbear a partial default. 
Atkeson (1991). Atkeson considers an enviroment similar to Grossman and, Van Huyck, 
however assumes asymmetric information between sovereign and lenders: the latter are not 
able to monitor whether the government consumes or invests the proceeds of the loan. Moral 
hazard prevents lenders from offering the sovereign full insurance, which would diminish the 
sovereign's incentive to invest the proceeds of the loan. Atkeson's model shows that the optimal 
lending contract under risk of repudiation and moral hazard specifies that in the worst possible 
state of nature (i.e., lowest realizations of output) a capital flow from the borrowing country 
to the lenders and as well, a fall in consumption and investment. Atkeson attributes low 
realizations of consumption and investment in LDCs and reverse capital flows to lenders in 
the early 19805 to the presence of moral hazard. The character of asymmetric information 
in Atkeson's model is similar to that in the models of Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986, 
1990). They show that in cartels, in the presence of moral hazard, "punishment phases" occur 
on the equilibrium path. The worst outcomes in the random process that is correlated with 
each player's action will happen with positive probability no matter how cooperative players 
are. Nevertheless, if punishments are not invoked in these worst states, players will not have 
incentive to cooperate in the first place. Abreu (1988) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) 
show that worst punishments, those that deliver the lowest present value and hence support the 
most cooperation, produce incentives where players "go along with their own punishments." 
The negative capital flows of Atkeson's model are of this character. 
Bulow and RogofJ {1989b). The results of the model are that i.} if lenders have access to 
a sanction above and beyond the ability to prevent the sovereign from aquiring credit in the 
future, then positive debt is sustainable; ii.) lenders will impose a debt ceiling on sovereigns; 
iii.) this ceiling may be well below the present value of debt service payments the sovereign 
can feasibly make; iv.) the debt ceiling increases with the severity of the punishment lenders 
can impose, and decreases with the opportunity cost of funds (the real interest rate) of the 
ler..ders. The model incorporates the fact that the credibility problem in sovereign lending is 
two-sided - just as the sovereign cannot commit to repay ex ante, lenders cannot commit to 
"walk away from the table" and implement an inefficient sanction if by renegotiating they can 
�1O� 
salvage more value from the contract. That is, ex post, lenders may be "tempted" into not 
carrying out sanctions in return for compensation greater than they would receive implementing 
the punishment, but less than the full value of payments initially contracted. The implication 
is that ex ante, lenders don't lend so much as to put themselves in such a situtation. Two-sided 
bargaining accounts for the restrictive predictions for debt ceilings. 
Ill. Military Finance during the Reign of Philip 1I 
Revenues and Expenditures 
The Spanish Crown's revenues were of four general categories: i) ordinary rents; ii) ex­
traordinary rentsj iil) income from the Indies; and (iv) extraordinary expedients. The first two 
revenue sources largely came from within Castile and were stable and increasing throughout 
the reign.l1 Income from the Indies and expedients fluctuated and also grew during the period. 
See Figures 1 and 2.18 Military expenditures accounted for the majority of spending and were 
volatile. See Figure 3. 
Asientos 
When financing immediate military or domestic expenditures, the Crown contracted with 
a group of foreign financiers led by Genoese. The principal contract between Crown and its 
financiers was the asiento. An asiento covered one or a combination of three specific transac­
tions: an unsecured short-term loan, a transfer of payment, and a currency exchange contract. 
Typically, asientos contracted with ·the Crown had all three components.19 Many asientos were 
contracted for the purpose of "rolling over" earlier asientos that had matured and that the 
Crown could not fully retire. Interest rates on asientos ranged from 8 to 22%, with 12% being 
typical. Fees for exchange and transfer ranged from 6 to 12% of principal.2o Data on principal 
outstanding on asientos appears in Figure 4. 
17While all Philip Il's European subjects paid taxes, only Castile and the colonies in the Indies generated 
enough surplus to provide revenues for WAr. Revenue. provided by Flanders, for example. were fAr less than 
expenditure on WAr and a.dministration in that kingdom. 
lIThe d.ta presented in this and other figure. below have been collected from sources that vuy from original 
Archive documents to informed. guesses by experts such u Ulloa. These I50Urcet are: Archivo Genera.1 de Siman­
cas, CJH 364-6, 501-504; Anoia. (1982), Braudd (1912), Cuande (1949, 1990), Dom.insuez-Ortiz (1983, 1981) • .  
Ha.m.ilton (1934), Lovett (1912, 1980, 1982), Lynch (1981), Ruiz MArtin (1965, 1991), PArker (1912), Thompson 
(1971). Ulloa (1986). All sonrcea were not necessa.rily con.aistent. Wht discretion 1 used in adjudicating them 
wa.a guided by a.ccounUng identitie. and preference for the intermediate figure. They can be obtained on diskette 
from the author. 
ltFor example, the Crown might contract in Madrid for a certain number of gold florins to be delivered in 
Bruges and the Crown would pay the banker in Madrid. When the Crown paid, it paid in silver realel. not the 
coin that ha.d been delivered abroad. Fina.lly, the Crown would not have to deliver the agreed quantity of silver 
for a number of month. or even more th&ll & year. Agreements specifying pa.yment upon the Arriva.1 of the Indies 
fleet were also common. 
1OFor more backgrou.nd on a,;entonee Braude! (1912). CArande (1949, 1990), Lovett (1972, 1980, 1982), Ruiz 
MArtin (1965, 1990), &lid Ulloa (1986). 
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The bankruptcies 
The bankruptcies of 1557, 1560, 1575, and 1596 were similar in nature.21 The bankruptcy 
of 1557 was not definitively concluded, rather the Crown came into some unexpected funds and 
was able to delay final reckoning until 1560. The bankruptcy of 1575 at the outset appeared to 
be quite different, due to the break-down in negociations and the imposition of the embargo of 
transfer of payments. Nevertheless it was ultimately concluded in the same fashion as those of 
1560 and 1596. To trace a general outline, at the outset of a typical bankruptcy the Genoese­
led cartel would cease to extend the Crown new asientos in the quantities it wanted. The 
Crown would then announce a suspension of payment on asientos and other accounts payable 
in arrears. This was known as the "'decN!to". Payments on juror2 were not suspended.23 The 
Crown and its creditors would then negotiate to resolve the suspension. Creditors would slow 
or halt new lending and international transfers of payment until terms were settled. During 
the shorter negociations of 1560 and 1596, it is not clear if a freeze was imposed or if in the 
confusion of negociations expedition of asientos was slowed. It is abundantly clear, however, 
that freezes on lending and on transfers were forcefully imposed from 1575 to 1578.24 The two 
freezes were separate measures: the freeze on transfers could have been eased even as new loans 
were denied, since the king could have simply payed silver up front for new transfers. However 
both measures were imposed, with the consequence that the Crown's capacity to make war 
beyond its borders was seriously impaired until it reached agreement with its lenders. 
The agreements that concluded the negociations, called "'medios generales", stipulated that: 
1. lenders of asientos be repaid in large part with juras, the remaining portion in specie. 
2. lenders accept a write-down on principal. The write-down might be implicit, in that the 
juras the lenders accepted paid low interest and traded below face-value in secondary 
markets. The write-down also might be negotiated explicitly. 
3. the lenders end the freeze on financial services, in particular, that they resume transfers 
of payment to the king's troops abroad. 
llFor the bankruptcies of 1557 and 1560, Ruiz Ma.rtin (1965) a.nd U11oa. (1986). For tbe ba.nkruptcy of 1575, 
Braudel (1979), Lovett (1980, 1982), Parker (1978), Rui2 Martin (1990), and U11oa. (1986); for tbe bankruptcy 
of 1596, Cutillo-Pintado (1973) and Ulloa. (1986). 
llThe annuity-like instrument& held by 5ubjects within Castile. 
llThis suggests that jura, and o,iento, were backed by different commitment mecha.nisms. This thesis is 
pursued in Conklin (1994). The issue of domestically-held jura, was instrumental in resolving ba.nkruptcy 
negocia.tions between tbe Crown &lid its international lenders. Because the primary focus of this study is on 
international Crown borrowing, discussion below covers jura, only to tbe extent tbat they bea.r on international 
debt. For a. history of jura, see Castillo-Pintado (1963). 
ltSee, Appendix for more deta.il on tbe wuuptcy of 1575. 
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1610 
Simultaneously the king would negotiate with the Cortes, the representative body of the towns 
and villages under royal jurisdiction, an increase in taxes in order to fund the new juroS.25 
IV. Evidence of implicit insurance in asiento contracts 
The implicit insurance class of debt models are appealing because they account for many fact� 
of contemporary defaults among LDCs. Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) point out that "(1) 
Defaults are associated with identifiably bad states of the world. (2) Defaults are usually 
partial rather than complete. (3) Sovereign states often are able to borrow again soon after 
default. ,,26 One could argue that the Spanish bankruptcies in the sixteenth century generally fit 
the description just given and that asientos should be interpreted as having an implicit insurance 
component. This position would interpret the proximate cause of the Spanish bankruptcies as 
being "bad shocks" as opposed to hitting a debt ceiling. The regularity and rapid conclusion of 
the bankruptcies of 1560 and 1596 appear to favor this explanation. However other historical 
facts speak decisively against the implicit insurance interpretation. Firstly, if ever Philip II 
received a bad shock, it was when he lost the Armada in 1588. If he and the Genoese bad 
followed the equilibrium described by Grossman and Van Huyck, surely the insurance would 
have kicked in at this point.27 In addition, in order to support positive debt in equilibrium, 
Grossrnan and Van Huyck rely on the assumption that the sovereign has no access to other 
assets to insure against shocks or to save. The Crown had available at least one asset to use 
in this manner, the proverbial war Chest. This fact and Bulow and Rogoff's (1989a) no-lending 
result suggest that Genoese needed some additional sanction to enforce their claims on the 
Crown. 
V. Evidence on the Genoese's Penalty 
Evidently, by their actions during the bankrupty of 1575, the Genoese posessed the ability to 
halt transfers of payment used to pay and provision the king's army in Flanders. The halted 
transfers of 1575-1578, however, do not necessarily constitute incontrovertable evidence that 
the Genoese "played" an equilibrium resembling that of lenders in Bulow and Rogoff's model. 
In light of the large sums owed them by a Crown suspending payment, the Genoese may have 
25There are many puzzliug features about the bankruptcies that this study does not purport to explain. Among 
them, why the Crown paid out juro, to the Genoese in bulk at bankruptcies, instead of issuing the iuro.,itself and 
not running up urears with the Genoese at all. Conklin (1994) accounts for some of these anomalous features. 
ltIGrossman and Van Huyck (1988) p. 1088. 
27Ulloa (1986)shows that in 1588 and 1589, the king had at from 4 to 6 million ducats in arrears to Genoese 
bankers. P. 810. However rather than ca.lling on the Genoese, Philip called on the Corte$ de Ca,tilla for more 
funds. 
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Figure 4: Debt Service on Juros (solid line) and Principal Outstanding on Asientos (dotted 
line) 
been simply unable to clear letters of exchange on European bourses. However this was not the 
case. The Genoese remained active during the bankruptcy, and cleared letters of exchange on 
the behalf of other clients.28 Moreover, throughout Philip's reign, the Indies fleet arrived every 
year with silver of roughly one fourth annual expenditure. The fleet arrived during bankruptcy 
negociations as well, enabling the Crown to pay up front for letters of exchange. Still, the 
Genoese did not execute transfers. 
The Genoese's boycott on transfers inflicted appreciable losses on the Crown, losses that 
quite plausibly were of the same or greater magnitude than a trade embargo, the interpretation 
of the model's punishment given by Bulow and Rogoff. One measure of this magnitude is the 
Crown's annual expenditure in Flanders, estimated at 2 million ducats a year.29 At roughly one 
fourth of the annual royal budget, this figure apparently reveals that the Crown had a strong 
desire to fight there. If the Crown received some "consumer surplus'" in its military expenditures, 
28Ehrenberg (1928), p. 120. Ruiz Martin (1990), p. 28. 
2�Thompson (1977), p. 268. 
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its utility loss to not being able to fight there would even be higher. A second measure of the 
Crown's loss from the Genoese's embargo is the a.ctual outcome in military terms. The sa.cking 
of Antwerp on November 1576 by Philip's own troops was a military disaster. Though it was 
not uncommon (or sovereigns of the period to owe their soldiers arrears o( as much as two or 
even three years (the king's Dutch opponents also owed arrears to troops), it was critical to 
make regular and periodic partial payments so that troops could eat.30 The mutiny spurred the 
king's Dutch opponents to more aggressive offense and interrupted commerce and tax revenues 
in the heart of the Spanish Netherlands. Shortly after the king ascertained the extent of the 
deterioration of his military position, he moderated his demands and re-initiated negociations 
with his creditors. 
The effectiveness of the Genoese's penalty hinged critically on the fact that the Crown was 
fighting an ongoing war in Flanders: were the king to have won in Flanders, the Genoese's 
penalty would suddenly be less harmful. The Genoese needed to lend in a fashion such that 
the moment victory came, tl)e king's debts to them be negligible. On the eve of the 1575 
bankruptcy, Philip's military governor, the Duke of Alva, had compiled a string of military 
successes, and appeared to be on the verge of victory. This posed a problem for the Genoese, as 
their claims against the king not covered by collatera.l31 were in the neighborhood of 7 million 
ducats, about one year's revenues for the Crown. While there is no direct evidence,32 the logic 
of sovereign debt theory suggests that the Genoese had ample motive to undo Philip 11 in 
Flanders for fear he might not repay them once he had won. 
Circumventing the Penalty 
A possible reaction by the Crown to the Genoese embargo would have been to circumvent 
it by exchanging and transporting specie itself. A number of factors that made this option 
impractical, however. Hostilities with France ruled out the most direct overland route to Flan­
ders. Poor relations with England meant that Spain risked losing any specie it tried to ship 
through the English channel.33 Finally, the costs and risks of shipping silver specie along the 
3(lO'Neill (1984). Just as lenders rendered their agreements with sovereigns self-enforcing, so did the mercenary 
troops. If a sovereign rcneged on its obligations bcyond a certain, tolerated degree, troops mutinied. 
31This collateral was jural de re,gulJrdo, domestica.lly funded annuities that the Genoesc were allowed to sell 
(and hence recovcr their capital) on the condition that once the Crown repaid thc lJ"iento, the bankcr had to 
produce and return a seeurity of equal value. See the Appendix for more detail. 
�2Ruiz Marlin (1990) hints that the Genoesc may have had a hand in incitins thc troops to mutiny in Antwcrp 
(p. 12), as does Braudel (1972) v. I p. 507. Geoffrcy Parker finds this implausible given the Genoese's ultimate 
interest in thc Crown's final success. However, he confirms thc effectiveness of the Genoesc refusal to write or 
bonor any bill of exchange for the King of Sp&i.n from 1575 to 1578, that this led to thc $l.ck of Antwerp, and 
that thc sack was thc decisive cvcnt in turning the bankruptcy negociations in the Gcnocsc'l favor (telephone 
intervicw with Professor Parker, at New Haven, er from Austin, TX, May 1994). 
Unuring the banlu::uptcy of 1575, the Crown sent 800,000 ducats of bullion to Laredo, a port on Spain's 
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Spanish Road were deemed to be too great as weU.34 The Crown could simply not deliver the 
necessary amounts of silver specie to Flanders on its own behalf. International financiers were 
able to make the transfer because they could exploit net flows of international payments to 
write letters of exchange to the Low Countries, for the most part avoiding physical transport 
of specie altogether.3S 
Maintaining the Cartel 
The Crown's other potential option to get around the embargo was to entice other financiers 
or even renegade members of the Genoese cartel to conduct transfers on its behalf. The Genoese, 
in response, had to provide their coalition members with incentives strong enough to prevent 
them from going over to the side of the Crown. The problem of preventing coalition defections is 
well-known in game theory. In order for a coaltion to credibly impose a penalty, no member may 
gain more by defecting than by participating in imposing the penalty. This would imply that 
the Genoese too had to bave intra-coalition promises and penalties.36 The obvious measure 
for the Genoese was to kick a defector out of the lending cartel in the future.37 A banned 
lender would lose access to information and coordinated efforts that made the operations of 
the Genoese operations so profitable in the first place_38 Loss of citizenship and other rights 
within Genoa might have been a possible threat as well. During the bankruptcy of 1575, the 
Fugger came to the Crown with an offer to exchange and ship currency to Flanders in return 
for being exempted from the bankruptcy decree,39 an offer the Crown was quite willing to 
northern coasl, to be shipped to Flanders through lhe English channel. Crown officials responsible for the 
transfer ultimately shipped less than half of it, determining that the risks of weather and seizure by the English 
too great. Lovett (1982), p. 4. Braudel (1912) v. I p. 506 confirms the English blocka.de on Spanish shipping 
through the channel. 
3tThe Spanish Road was an overland route from Lombardy in Northern Italy to the Low Countries. It ran 
along the Rhine valley through non-hostile duchies and principalities. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries it was of enormous strategic importance to Spain, as it was the principal if not the only route by which 
Spain could move Spanish and Italian troops and Albanian mercenaries to Flanders. See Parker (1972) for a 
history. Braudel (1972) v. I. p. 542 states that 50 arquebusiers were required to accompany a transfer of specie 
from Genoa to Flanders in the latter sixteenth century. 
Ulnternational financiers of the period were not always a.ble to count on trade flows to balance international 
payments. In such situation. financiers arranged physical transport of specie, preferably gold, to dear payments. 
In these cases it wu standard practice to re-insure the specie shipped. Lovett (1982), p. 15., recounts an incident 
where Elizabeth of England seized a number of pay ships in 1569. The ships were contracted through the Genoese, 
who received 120,000 ducats in compensation for the loss thanks to their reinsurance. This immediately leads 
one to ask why the Crown did not seek to reinsllre large quantity shipments of specie through the channel in 
1575. While I bave found no direct evidence, the Genoese may have been able to extend their boycott on the 
Crown to reinsurance. 
"See G,en (1989, 1993), Greif, Milgrom and Weingut (1994), and Weingut (1995) for strategic analysis of 
these issues in the context of Europe in the middle ages. 
3fFoT example Braudel (1972) v. I indicates that in the great comercial and financial fair of Piacenza the 
Genoese controlled right of admission. 
31Braudel (1972) v. I p. 505; Ruiz Martin (1990), p. 41; 102-103. 
3tLovett (1982), p. 4, Ruiz Martin (1990), pp. 18-19. 
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accept.40 Nevertheless, the Fugger were unable to deliver the quantities of specie that the 
Crown needed.41 In no small part, tills failure was due to countermeasures and harrassment by 
the Genoese and their agents.42 Genoese prevailed by 1578 and in the end, the Fugger were not 
exempted from the suspension decree. Just as with the Fugger I any single defector from the 
cartel would not be able to deliver on the scale of the coalition as a. whole and not be successful 
in striking and executing contracts with the king.43 
In summary, during the bankruptcies of 1557 and 1596, the Crown accepted the need to 
negotiate with the Genoese in good faith and settled its arrears quickly. In 1575, it attempted 
to repudiate its debt, and in the course of this action tried, in two ways, to circumvent the 
Genoese's penalty. First by shipping specie itself, second by attempting to lure defectors from 
the Geneose·led coalition to make transfers on its behalf. Neither measure succeeded, and the 
Crown repaid its lenders. 
The Monopoly on Specie Transfer 
The Genoese--Ied cartel's dominance in the clearing of bills of exchange and large scale specie 
transfer was a critical element in the success of the embargo. The Genoese's advantages in this 
business included an extensive network of depositors throughout Europe,44 the capacity to 
integrate lending, specie exchange, trade and insurance services, and a strong presence in the 
great fairs and exchanges throughout the Mediterranean and Western Europe.4S Through these 
resources, the Genoese were able to capture increasing returns to scale in international financial 
services. More decisive, however, was Genoa's geographic proximity to Venice which allowed its 
financiers to clear a three-way market in spices and luxury goods (which originated in the Far 
East and passed through Northern Italy on their way into Europe), silver (the Spanish Crown's 
means of payment to the Genoese), and gold (received from Dutch and Flemish merchants in 
exchange for Far Eastern luxuries).46 The Portuguese would seem natural competitors to the 
4°Ruiz Mutin (1990) documents that certain royal counsellors advoca.ted this same bankruptcy decree in order 
to allow Castilian comercia.l interests a foothold in the busillCSS of financing the king (p. 19). 
HDuting the early 15705, payments from Castile to Flanders averaged well over two million ducats a. yeu; 
tra.n.sfers by the Fugger amounted to just one milliOll ducats over the entire three yeus of the bankruptcy. Ulloa 
(1986), p. 795. 
uEhrenberg (1928) p. 126 reports on these efforts by the Fugger: "Direct bill transactions between Spain and 
Antwerp were now (by the late 16th century] absolute; but the Fuger were very nervous about using the new 
markets, especially the Genoese bill fairs, but also Lisbon, Lyons and Florence.- This nervousness arose from 
the hostility of Genoese toward competitors breiling the boycott. 
uThis consequence was visited upon the Fngger in the afterma.th of the events of 1575-1578: "[Their action] 
roused the other creditors against the Fugger, so that they tried to do them a.t Court all the hum they could." 
Ehrenberg (1928), p. 125. In 1596 the New Christian filll.nciers of Lisbon and the Fugger offered to circumvent 
potential Genoese embargos, however the Crown did not make use of their offers. Bra.udel (1972) v. I p. 514. 
uRuiz Mutin (1990), pp. 82·105. 
uSuch as Antwerp, Lyon, Medina. del Campo, and Piacenza.. 
·'Specifically, net flows of silver went to the Fa.r East in exchange for luxury goods (spices, etc.). Those luxury 
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Genoese in clearing international balances of payments because they had cheaper transportation 
to the Far East than the Venetians. However precisely during this time period (1550-1625) the 
Portuguese lost military and political control over the hinterlands of their Persian and Indian 
factories (fortified trading posts). The Venetians, though they had higher transport costs with 
their overland routes, did more business than the Portuguese because they had better relations 
with local political powers.47 
Why we observe the penalty 
The model of Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) assumes perfect information and common-knowledge 
and predicts that no punishment-phases take place along the path of play. While these assump­
tions were necessary for tractability and enhanced the clarity of the model, they hardly apply 
to late sixteenth century Europe. There, communication and transport conditions varied con­
stantly due to changes in technology and also through interaction with the elements, geography 
and changing political circumstances. It is far-fetched, at best, to think that the Genoese cartel 
and the Crown knew each other's strategies, knew the other knew its strategy, and had sure 
knowledge of the action space available to each other. Relaxing assumptions about information 
should change the model's implications in predictable fashion. In other models of dynamic 
strategic interaction under imperfect information, punishment-phases take place along the path 
of play. In Atkeson (1991), in the worst output outcomes, the sovereign endures low consump­
tion, low investment and a reverse capital flow. In models of oligopoly and in general models 
of multiple player games, the addition of information imperfections induces punishment-phases 
along the path of play.48 
Hence, given the nature ofinformation in the sixteenth century, I conjecture that on occasion 
a punishment-phase would occur along the path of play. I interpret the Genoese embargo of 
goods tha.t were traded to Northern Europe were ultima.t.ely paid for in gold coin. Hence, in aggrega.te, traden 
and by exteusion their agents in the Low Countries were "long" gold, ud "short" silver, the specie demuded 
in the Fu East for the next trading venture. The Spa.nish Crown was long silver (received from its American 
colonies) ud .hort gold (needed to pay troops in Flanden). The Genoese cleared the traden' long position in 
gold for the Crown'. short po$ition by letters of exchange: traders would receive delivery of silver in Seville, 
Medina del Campo, or Madrid (which was as convenient as Antwerp or any other comercid center of the time 
in terms of shipping it to the Far East). On the other side of the transaction, the Crown received gold in the 
Low Countries and delivered silver to Seville, Madrid or Medina. del C.a.mpo. Of course a cleuing of bahnce of 
payments would not exactly ma.tch Crown demands for gold with traders' demand. for silver, so specie would 
have to be transported between Meditena.nean fain and trade centers and the Low Countries. Braudel (1972) 
Y. I p. 543-570; Braudel (1979); Ruiz Martin (1990). 
47Boyajia.n (1983), Introduction, Braudel (1979), p. 170. The situation favoring Venice reversed to favor the 
Portuguese by the 1620s. Not surprisingly, the Genoese suffered unusually large write-downs in the bankruptcy 
of 1627, and &fterwud were replaced by New Christian financiers of Lisbon u the principal lenders to Philip 
IV. By 1627, the Genoese threat to prevent the king from ttusferring fund. to provision troops was no longer 
sustainable. Though the Genoese retreated from roy&1 lending, this bankruptcy by no mea.ns spelt the ruin of 
the city-state. 
41 Abreu, Peu� and Stacchetti (1986, 1990). See theory section, above. 
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1575 to 15i8 as precisely this. I attribute the information imperfection to the fact that the 
Crown could not monitor the implementability of the Genoese's penalty. That is, the Crown 
had less information than the Genoese as to its ability to transfer specie either on its own or 
through non-cartel fiananciers. 
Generality of the circumstances surrounding the penalty 
The Genoese's willingness to lend to Philip H depended upon their logistical and financial 
resources in a region of strategic importance, and their ability to use the withdrawal of these 
resources as a penalty. Given the close connection between credit and war, we might expect 
to see a general relationship between who a sovereign's lenders are and how much influence 
they have over the sovereign's vital strategic interests. Philip I1's father, Charles V, used the 
Fugger of southern Germany as his principal bankers. Their sway and political importance in 
that region were important to Charles because he was Holy Roman Emperor.49 Philip H, who 
did not inherit his father's Austrian possessions nor the Holy Roman imperial title, quickly 
came to employ the Genoese as his principal financiers. The Low Countries were of far greater 
importance during his reign and the Genoese had a heavy comercial and financial presence iri 
that region. Within a year of Philip's accession, the Fugger found that the Genoese's claims on 
the Crown received a much higher priority than their own. In 1563 the Fugger were still trying 
to collect claims from before the bankruptcy of 1557. 
VI. The Debt Ceiling 
The model of Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) predicts a debt ceiling below the present value of debt 
service payments the government can feasibly make. The model also predicts a debt ceiling 
below, possibly well below, the present value of the loss of enduring the lender's penalty. To 
determine if a debt ceiling due to a "credibility constraint" was binding as predicted by Bulow 
and Rogoff's model, I estimate lower bounds on these two ceilings and compare them to the 
Crown's actual debt limit. 
The present value of revenues available for servicing asientos 
To calculate the present value of government revenues available for servicing asientos, I do 
not consider all of the Crown's revenues. The Crown's total fiscal liabilities included many 
obligations besides asientos. The present value of all revenues yields an upper bound on a 
ceiling for all liabilities instead of asientos alone. Nearly all of the Crown's Indies income was 
tlChules borrowed from the Fugger 530,000 of the 850,000 florins he u.sed to bribe the Electors for the title. 
Sucb was the simplicity of politics in an earlier time tba.t the bribe won the young king unanimous election on 
18 June, 1519. 
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Table 1: The Present Value of Indies Revenues up to 1660 (in ducats) 
Discount rate: In 1550: In 1575: In 1600: 
2% 54,349,772 67,241,644 40,519,654 
5% 20,868,554 37,250,480 22,837,321 
10% 8,560,810 20,092,291 1 1 ,412,302 
paid over to the Genoese-Ied cartel for service on asientos.50 Therefore I use the net present 
value of Indies revenues for a bound for a debt ceiling based on revenues available to service 
asientos. Because many other tax sources within Castile were used to retire asientos when 
Indies revenues were not sufficient, this bound is biased downward, making it a conservative 
estimate.51 The Crown's share of Indies silver is shown in Figure 2. These figures are given 
in five year averages, accounted in pesos of 450 maravedis.52 Table 1 shows the net present 
value of these revenues with the series truncated at 1660 assuming various discount rates.53 For 
example, in 1575, using a 5% discount rate, the present value of Indies revenues for the next 
85 years was over 37 million ducats.5" 
The present value of enduring the Genoese's penalty 
I construct an estimate of the present value of the Genoese penalty by assuming the Crown 
valued warring. or war's expected outcome, at least as much as the resources it spent on war. 
Under this assumption the present value of military expenditures in the Low Countries yields a 
conservative estimate of the loss of not being able to war in Flanders. Though we do not have 
these complete data, Thompson (1977) provides fairly accurate figures for selected years over 
the period, shown in Table 2. Crown expenditure ranges from 2 to 4 million ducats a year; 
1.6 to 3.2 million in ducats if deflated to 1550 prices.55 Exceptionally low expenditure levels 
occurred in 1577, during the Genoese embargo and in 1608, on the eve of the 12-years' truce. 
All told, the Crown spent about 2 million ducats (deflated) a year on military expenditures in 
�Ullol. (1986), pp. 774-787 . 
.n At the conclusion of each bankruptcy, the Genoese accepted iural which. were funded by ordinuy rents from 
within Castile. 
52The ducat contained 375 marolJedil. 
HBy 1660 Spain wu no longer a. military power of significance in Europe iUld ceased contracting a,ientOl in 
large amounts. Whilea Genoese banker or Spanish IOvereign would not have known the end game wu in 1659 
(the Treaty of the Pyrenees), this exercise approximates the expected present value of revenues available to pay 
Glientol with the ex post realization. 
�. Although GlientOlcontracu quoted interest rate payments of 8% to 20%, these rates should not be considered 
"interest." Ex post returns on Glientol, incorporating the impact of periodic bankruptcies, tended to be in the 
4.% to 8% range at a time when interest rates in Genoa were between 2% and 3%. Hence, the function of high 
interest payments seemed to be for the purpose of faster capital recovery given the "haircut" to principal tha.t 
bankruptcies inevitably entailed. This form of contracting strikes me u curious, however its explanation lies 
beyond the scope of this inquiry. 
55 Price indices are from Hunilton (1934). 
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Table 2: Military Expenditures in Flanders, Various Years 
Flanders. Table 3 presents the present value of expenditure streams of 1, 2 and 3 million ducats 
at various interest rates at an eighty-year horizon. At a discount rate of 5%, the present value 
of the Genoese penalty would be just over 40 million ducats. 
The Crown's actual debt ceiling 
Determining a sovereign's actual debt ceiling is complicated by some considerations. Firstly, 
judging from theory, a debt ceiling may change over time according to fluctuations in the real 
interest rate available to lenders on other investments and in the factors governing the severity 
of retaliatory sanctions. Also, theory does not identify how to distinguish whether a maximum 
level of indebtedness represents a sovereign hitting its ceiling, or simply a coincidental peak 
nowhere near the ceiling. Fortunately, circumstances in the Spanish episode allow us to identify 
the Crown's actual debt ceiling. The Genoese initiated each bankruptcy by witholding further 
lending to the king: Lovett states, "the bankruptcy of 1575 took place because the bankers 
refused to advance any more money, and the king resumed for his own use the revenues assigned 
to pay royal debts."s6 Lovett also states that the Genoese were able to anticipa.te Philip's decrees 
of suspension of payment better than the king's closest counsellors.57 This would be an easy 
forecast to make given the Genoese themselves initiated the decree by refusing to lend more. 
Castillo-Pintado (1973) also suggests that in 1596 it was Genoese hesitance to lend more to 
the Crown that lead to that bankruptcy. Therefore, I identify the Crown's debt ceiling by the 
quantity of a.rrears in asientos not backed by collateral on the eve of each bankruptcy. Figure 
4 shows the total principal owed on asientos 1555-1577 by a dotted line. The three peaks on 
the asientos series reflect outstanding principle the eve of the three early bankruptcies. The 
starred point in 1575 represents the total principal of asientos less the value of the juros de 
�'Loveu (1982) p. 1. 
HLovett (1980) p. 909. 
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Table 3: The Present Value of 1, 2 and 3 Million Ducats over an 80-year Horizon 
Discount rate: Annual Expenditure: Present Value of Expenditure: 
2% 1 million 40.54 million 
2 million 81.08 million 
3 million 121.62 million 
5% 1 million 20.58 million 
2 million 41.15 million 
3 million 61. 73 million 
10% 1 million 10.99 million 
2 million 21.98 million 
3 million 32.97 million 
resguardo given as collateral by the CrowD.ss The starred point in 1596 shows the value of 
principal outstanding in asientos on the eve of the 1596 bankruptcy.59 The graph shows that 
uncollateralized arrears on asientos fell in the range of 7 million to 9 million ducats on the eves 
of each of the bankruptcies. I interpret this range to indicate the Crown's effective debt ceiling. 
Consistent with Bulow and Rogoff's (1989b) model of sovereign debt, this ceiling-range is below 
the range of present value of revenues (9 - 60 million) and the present value of losses incurred 
by sanctions (11 - 120 million). 
Other features of the episode accounted for by the debt ceiling 
The debt ceiling predicted by theory accounts for why the Crown and the Genoese conducted 
a jurc;for-asiento swap at the conclusion of each bankruptcy.60 Because the Crown was at its 
debt ceiling, the Genoese could not roll-over more asientos without undermining the mechanism 
that backed their claims. Nevertheless, to continue a profitable relationship with the Crown, 
they needed to find a way to allow it to defer payment. By accepting newly issued juros as 
payment for asientos, the Genoese enabled the Crown to float more debt yet no longer be near 
its asiento ceiling. The Genoese would then sell the juros to Castilian subjects, liquidating their 
position. The Genoese accepted juros because they could unload them right away. However this 
begs the question of credibility once more: a Castilian subject would not accept a jura from a 
king just emerging from bankruptcy unless he had some leverage over the king. The historical 
record reveals that the Crown did honor its debts in jums, and that annual real debt service 
�. Juro, de resguardo were annuity-like instruments gn.nted to the Genese as b&dcing for (l,ientos in the years 
between 1562 and 1575. See the Appendix A, below. 
�IData on principal outstanding are not available for the yeus between 1578 and 1596. 
eOProviding an general rationale for the Spanish system of finance and its periodic bankruptcies Iiee well 
beyond the objective of this passa.ge. Such an exercise would have to consider the political economy of t&xes 
voted to service juro" the credibility mechanism backing juro., and a. host of other wues. Here I explain only 
the o'ient�£or.juro swap feature of the bankruptcies. 
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on juros grew for decades after the conclusion of Philip I1's reign. I conclude from this that an 
alternative credibiltiy mechanism backed juros, and that during Philip's reign the Crown was 
below its ceiling in juros.61 
VII. Conclusion 
This paper examined asiento debt contracts between Genoese lenders and Philip II of Spain 
(1556-1598) from the perspective of theory on sovereign debt. The episode provides an unusually 
good test of two types of theories on sovereign debt, the additional penalty class of models, and 
the implicit insurance class of models. The additional penalty class of debt models accounts 
for why Philip II repaid his lenders. The Genoese had a penalty technology to use against the 
Crown in the event of attempted repudiation, an embargo on specie delivery from Spain to 
the king's troops in Flanders, and they used it. The implicit insurance class of debt models 
was rejected: the most clearly identifiable a bad shock during Philip's reign was the loss of 
the Armada in 1588. This event elicited no concessionary terms from the Genoese, nor did 
it provoke a royal bankruptcy or a rescheduling of repayments by the Crown. Moreover, the 
Crown had the capacity to self-insure through savings, a violation of the assumptions of this 
class of models. Because the episode allows us to observe the debt ceiling Philip II's lenders 
imposed, bound below the cost of penalties to the sovereign, and bound below the sovereign's 
ability to repay, I was able to test implications of Bulow and Rogoff's (1989b) model of sovereign 
debt. The facts of the episode were found to correspond to the predictions of the theory. 
61Conklin (1994) analyzes the credibility mechanism tha.t backed juroJ. 
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Appendix A: Summary of the Bankruptcy of 1575 
The bankruptcy of 1 September 1575 was distinct from the bankruptcies of 1557, 1560 and 1596 
in important ways that illuminate much about the underlying mechanisms of commitment .of 
Philip Il's debt.62 On the eve of the bankruptcy, arrears in asientos had gatten especially high. 
Also, the negociations in the aftermath of the decreta were particularly acrimonious. This may 
have been by design, for the Crown attempted to circumvent its Genoese creditors and use 
other financiers. This a.ttempt ultimately failed, however. Finally, the Crown's intransigence 
delayed resolution of the bankruptcy for three years. While this surely tested the Genoese's 
capacity to maintain their embargo, it also made the consequences suffered by the Crown far 
more grave than in the other bankruptcies. 
The reason the fioating debt was allowed to mount was the Crown's military situation, fight­
ing Dutch rebels and the Turk simultaneously. It covered the large increase in expenditures by 
delaying payments to royal provisioners, noble officers who could be counted upon to finance 
their own companies, and most importantly, with Genoese credit. As obligations in asieT!tos 
rose, the Genoese bankers demanded that the Crown grant them some form of security. Pre­
sumably, the alternative for the king was getting cut off from new lending. The king offered 
thls security in the form of hlgh yielding juros. There were two classes of such juros, the juro 
de resguardo and the juro de caucion. A key condition in the transactions of both instruments 
was that if the Crown failed to pay back the principal on a given asiento, the banker got to 
keep the juro. What was more, the Crown had to continue to pay the difference between the 
original interest rate on the asiento and the interest rate on the jura, typically 2-5%, until the 
asiento was repaid. The jura de resguardo could be resold by the Genoese on the condition that 
when the Crown came to redeem the collateral security (repay the principal on the associated 
asiento and recover the jura) the banker had to produce a jura of equal face value, though not 
necessarily the original instrument. 
At some point between 1561 and 1575, the Crown began issuing large quantities of juras 
de resguardo to the Genoese, in parallel with the new issue of asientos. It was long standing 
practice by the Crown to issue juras with greatly varying interest rates and reliability, yet 
treat all the instruments as having the same legal value at par.53 With the issue of juras de 
resguardos, the Crown's legalistic fiction concerning the fa.ce value of juras bit with a passion: 
uBackground on this case comes from Lovett (1980, 1982), UUoa (1986), and Ruiz Martin (1990). 
uThe practice enabled the Crown to differentially default on different subjects on those occasions when it 
repaid obligations in jtJrol instead of currency. 
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the G�noese sold high interest (10%) juros de resguardo at what may well have been a premium 
over their face value, knowing that when the Crown came around to redeem the security they 
could produce a low interest (3.5%) or unreliable juro, of equal legal value. The latter security 
could be easily purchased at a discount from a client in the Genoese's network of Castilian 
depositors. The juro de caudan could not be resold to a client64 and never became a form of 
guarantee or security that the Genoese would accept. Moreover, the Genoese took the proceeds 
from the sale of the juros de resguardo, and re-invested in asientos, demanding higher interest 
rates and more juros de resguardo for security. It was estimated by one royal official that debt 
service on juros de resguardo issued within the five years preceeding the bankruptcy amounted 
to 480,000 ducats a year (out of revenues of about 6 million ducats). 
By 1575, revenues suitable for the funding of new juros de resguardo were exhausted and 
the coalition of bankers ceased to provide new lending. Phillp II took an antagonistic posture 
towards the lenders for abandoning him in his hour of need. Thus began the acrimony of 
the bankruptcy of 1575. Whether because of the severity of the Crown's stance or the sheer 
magnitude of the assets involved, the decreto caused panic in financial centers Spain, in Antwerp, 
and in Genoa as well.ss In the decreto the king ordered an investigation into every asientostruck 
since 1560 to look into the possibility of illegal profits and ursurious practices by the Genoese. 
The Genoese objected on the grounds that the Crown's own ministers originated every single 
asiento, and that the ministers themselves, largely jurists and theologians, were experts on 
usury laws.56 The bankers refused to capitulate to a renunciation of a large portion of the 
principal owed, which was estimated at over 15 million ducats (this figure does not deduct the 
value of the juros de resguardo ceded to the Genoese as security on asientos). 
This standoff that lasted well into 1576, during which time the Genoese imposed an embargo 
on specie transfer on Philip. The Crown was unable to get appreciable funds to its troops in 
Flanders, with the result that in November 1576 troops mutinied over arrears and sacked 
'4There is some conftict between the accounts o£ Lovett (1982, p. 6) and Rm Martin (1990, p. 14) on tu 
point. LoveU does not distinguish between the two instruments, &lid states that beginning in 1566 the Crown 
granted the Genoese permission to alienate juro, de re,gunnio as an expedient to encourage them to be more 
forthcoming on new lUiento,. Ruiz Martin, on the other hud, explains that from its inception in 1561, the 
re,guardo couJd be alienated, and the couci6n could not. In 1566 the Crown came to depend heavily on the 
re,guardo as the Genoese pla.ced grea' importance on the right to sdI the uset. 
uUlloa (1986) p. 790; "Lu collRQ.uenoas inmed..iatas de la suspension de pages £ueron eI. p.inico en £Spana y 
Genova; grandes quiebras y una paralizacion de muchas a.ctividades economicu en la primera.-
1620 years later, during the negociations following the decreto of 1596, the Genoese brought along a team of 
theologians to debate such matters if they came up. In fact, some of the king's counsellors did object to 'he 
proposed. medio general as beio.g too generous to the lenders. However the Genoese's expert theological witnesses 
dispatched lVith the reservatiou and the negociations continued placidly and without delay. Ulloa (1986), p. 
821. 
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Antwerp, a strategic entrepot in Spanish possession. Just as difficult for the Crown, new sieges 
in the 1575, 1576 and 1577 campaigning seasons (May through October) were ruled out. The 
Duke of Alba, who in 1574 seemed on the verge of final victory, suffered grave reverses to 
William (the Silent) of Orange by 1578. The bankruptcy was resolved when the king finally 
moderated his demands. Philip conceded that total debt owed was 15,184,464 ducats, omitting 
debts contracted in Antwerp and Bruges. The Crown conceded title on the juros de resguardo 
altogether, with a capitalized value of 8,132,983 ducats. If annual payment on these juros was 
480,000 ducats, this capitalized value is computed at roughly 6%, not the 10% that some of 
the juros paid.67 On the net of 7 million ducats still owed, the bankers accepted a write-down 
of 2,245,673 ducats on the premise of illegal profits. Of the remaining 4.8 million ducats, two­
thirds were converted into juros of 3.5%, and one-third was repaid in specie. The agreement 
also stipulated that the bankers be allowed to re-pay Castilian depositors in 3.5% juros at par 
(this device was referred to as de misma moneda). The final term of the agreement was for the 
Genoese coalition to provide 5 million ducats in new asientos over the course of the following 
six years.ss Thus, in  the end, the bankruptcy was concluded in similar fashion to those of 1560 
and 1596. 
S1UUoa (1986) notes that the Icing did cede title at a discount on poor-perlonning jUrol de re.gufJrdo, p. 791. 
s'These funds were provided by the consortium of Nicolao de Grimaldo and Esteban Lomelin; Juan de la Tone. 
Lucian Centurion and Agustin Espinola; Esteban Grillo and Baltuar Catano; and finally Domingo Lercaro, 
Bernaue Centurion and Viucenzio Genti!. Lovett, 1982, p. 18. A comment by Lovett suggests that these 5 
million were to be delivered in lump sum and that their delivery was an impressive display of Genoese financial 
might (p. 18). UUoa (1986), with different sources, concludes differently: the 5 million was actually to be delivered 
in 100,000 ducat increments for two months, and then in 200,000 ducat increments on a monthly bcasis over the 
rest of the year. The rema.inder of the sum had to be delivered before 1584. The Genoese were not obligated to 
fulfill subsequent deliveries if the king fell into arrears on earlier ones. It is apparent from UUoa's account that 
the king was more concerned with lifting the embargo on specie delivery than securing more credit. 
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